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THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF 926
NAVAL OFFENDERS
LEO F. CAIN AND MARK S. RICHMOND
Until recently, the authors of this article were assigned to the
Navy's correctional program as Reserve Officers in charge of prisoner
training and classification. Dr. Cain is now Professor of Educational
Psychology at the University of Oklahoma. Mr. Richmond has returned
to the Federal Prison Service as Administrative Officer for prisoner
morale and discipline.

This article, based on a study undertaken by

them while on active duty in the Navy, will be of particular interest to
criminologists as an analysis of certain factors in the post-release ad-

justment of prisoners.

The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily

reflect the views of the Navy Department.-EDITOR.

The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private ones of
the writers and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views
of the Navy Department or the Naval Service at large. (Art. 113 (2),
U. S. Navy Regulations.)

The evaluation of programs of rehabilitation is a difficult
but necessary undertaking if such programs are to be further
developed on the basis of factual experience. The present
Navy program for the rehabilitation of general court-martial
prisoners was begun in March, 1944, and the study that follows
was instituted primarily as a means of providing a more complete understanding of the nature of the problems to be dealt

with through an analysis of factors relating to the success and
failure of offenders restored to duty. Secondly, this study was
made in the hope that one or more postulates would evolve
which might be useful in improving techniques and procedures. Finally, it was thought that significant clues might be
discovered that would point the way for further research.
As presently organized, the Bureau of Naval Personnel administers four types of confinement activities for general courtmartial prisoners:
1. Prisons for long-term and serious offenders. The program is predominantly industrial, although a general educational program exists utilizing vocational trade training, voluntary evening classroom instruction and a wide selection of
correspondence courses.
2. DisciplinaryBarracks for short-term offenders who do not
qualify for confinement at a retraining command. At these activities an industrial program also is provided, but greater emphasis is placed on training. In addition to that which is
available at the prisons, there exists a compulsory training program for those who eventually will be restored to duty.
3. Retraining Commands for short-term tractable military
offenders who offer the best prospects for restoration to duty.
The program consists of as much diversified training for res390
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toration to duty as time and facilities permit. Included are
such subjects as basic seamanship, orientation, military drill
and specialized training in Navy trades. Supplemental instruction in other subjects and a wide choice of correspondence
courses are available on a voluntary basis. Work is primarily
of a maintenance nature and is assigned as training schedules
permit.
4. Brigs primarily for detentioners and persons serving confinement sentences other than general court-martial, although
of necessity, several of the larger brigs are authorized to confine certain short-term general court-martial prisoners. Due
to the highly transitory nature of their populations no standardized program of training has been formulated for the brigs.
In general, it has been the objective of the Navy to restore to
duty as many qualified men as possible through the utilization
of such standard penological principles as classification, individualization of prisoner programs and a positive approach to
individual problems and needs.
METHOD

Source of the Data
Special records of all Navy general court-martial prisoners are
maintained in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. These records are
initiated by the several activities confining general court-martial prisoners and forwarded to the Bureau on a commitment card. This
card contains commitment data (name, rate, service number, offense,
sentence, probation violation, district, date received) and personal
data (age, race, marital status, G.C.T. score, mental status, education,
mechanical aptitude, physical status, civil occupations, branch of
service, length of service, last ship or station, previous offenses).
Service records on all naval personnel are also maintained in the
Bureau. These records contain all enlistment data, beneficiary slips,
change of rating and advancements, medical entries, disciplinary actions including offenses and punishments, transfers, change of duty,
commendations, and separation records. Such records, while only
revealing adjustment to the service in an indirect manner, do give
an authentic report of any individual's status in the service at any
given time.
These two sources were used exclusively for this study. The commitment card information was utilized to describe the population and
the service records to determine adjustment to the service itself.
These data do not give any narrative information on the offenders
such as is contained in a social history or psychiatric report and while
the value of such are fully recognized it was not possible to obtain
such supplemental reports and records for this survey.

The Sample
The population studied was drawn from the men released from
confinement during March, 1945. Only Navy general court martial
prisoners were considered who were restored to active service duty.
Marine and Coast Guard prisoners were excluded, partly because of
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the inaccessibility of their service records and partly because they
were restored to duty under quite different circumstances. The Navy
releases totaled 1496, representing 91% of all general court martial
releases for the month. Of the number 80% or 1199 were restored
to duty and 297 or 20% were discharged to civilian life upon completion of sentence. Of the 1197 possible cases, 926 were analyzed;
237 were eliminated because of lack of information. Such elimination was of a random and not of a selective nature.
March releases were also selected because during that month tabulated records were completed for the entire general court-martial
prisoner population for the first time. Analysis of these records
furnished the first statistical basis for an understanding of the nature
of the prisoner population and these results have been used in part
as a control against which to measure certain findings of this study.
The essential features of the Corrective Services program were not
placed into effect until the Fall months of 1944, during which the
majority of the March releases were first committed, as will be shown
subsequently. So far as the follow-up portion of the study is concerned, the selection of March releases made possible analysis of
certain post-release factors under war-time conditions, since the follow-up period ended in September and hostilities ended in August.
Such an analysis would not have been possible had some subsequent
month of releases been chosen.
Factors Considered
The data available for analysis were divided into two groups:
"static" data, relating to factors obtained from the commitment card
and "follow-up" data, obtained from the service record relating to
factors occurring after release from confinement. The source of both
series of data has been discussed above.
The reasons for the choice and use of the static data presented
were, first, their availability and their relationship to certain control
factors available in the cross section survey that was made from tabulated records pertaining to all general court-martial prisoners confined in March, 1945, as well as to the total Navy population at that
time. Secondly, factors were selected that might have some possible
significance with respect to success and failure following restoration
to duty. Third, factors were chosen that would have a standardization value with reference to other studies. Finally, certain factors
which might be expected to have some bearing on success and failure
were not considered because of unavailability. These were intelligence scores, measures of physical condition and psychiatric data.
Other, such as civil offenses and occupational skills, were discarded
because of lack of complete uniformity in recording.
The selection and use of follow-up factors was determined entirely
by availability. Additional data would have been highly desirable,
particularly information relating to subsequent psychiatric findings,
positive adjustment factors and details of circumstances surrounding
changes in status.
Treatment of Data
The data were first considered in terms of the primary purpose of
the study, i.e., that of comparing the success and failure groups. Comparison was also made, where possible, between the sample considered and the total Navy population. Because the Naval Corrective
Services program is predicated on the principle of prisoner classifi-
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cation and as offenders were designated to confinement activities in
terms of their probable readjustment, prisons, disciplinary barracks
and retraining commands were also analyzed separately. In addition, because of some unexpected findings, the four largest of the
disciplinary barracks were considered individually.
Limitations
The data from which the following study was made have a number
of definite limitations:
1. The study is based entirely on performance records. Hence,
not only was there no opportunity for interviewing or personal examination of the data used, but all available information is subject
to the usual errors of recording. More important, however, is the
lack of such pertinent data as psychiatric findings, psychometric measures (including attitudes), previously acknowledged. Again, a number of incomplete items were discovered which showed up as "unknown" on the tabulations. The reliability and validity of a few
items are also open to question. These will be pointed out as they
occur in the discussion of findings.
2. Success and failure is based upon a six months period of adjustment.
3. While 926 cases ordinarily is a sufficiently large sample within
which to expect statistically significant findings, the number of cases
restored to duty from "prisons" and "other" activities was too small
in proportion to the number restored to duty from "retraining commands" and "disciplinary barracks" to permit valid comparisons of
all factors.
4. Certain of the service Records were incomplete, although, a one
month lag was allowed before any follow up data were taken from
the records. There were some cases where it was obvious that current entries had not been filed, particularly those relating to commendations and citations which are frequently awarded long after the
incident for such takes place.
Success and Failure
The definitions of "success" and "failure" used in this study have
been made arbitrarily by the authors. A case was considered a failure under each of the following circumstances: if absent over leave
or without leave and still at large six months after date of restoration to duty; if reconfined after being restored to duty awaiting disciplinary action for any offense for which probation might have been
revoked or for which a subsequent general court-martial might have
been awarded; if reconfined after being restored to duty to serve the
remainder of a sentence as a probation violator or to serve a subsequently imposed general court-martial sentence; and if discharged
from the Naval service prior to the six-month interval for violation
of probation. All other cases were considered "successful."
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Static Data
Of the 926 men studied, 614 or 66.31% succeeded and 312
or 33.69% failed. By types of confinement activities, it is indicated that a greater percentage of success were restored to duty
from retraining commands than from disciplinary barracks,
although there appeared substantial differences between cer-
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tain institutions of the same type. In general, the nature of
the sample, with respect to such factors as age, education, race,
marital status, length of service, and previous service rate held,'
approximated that of the total enlisted Navy population
(where comparison was possible) and that derived from a
cross-section survey of all general court-martial prisoners in
confinement during the month of March 1945. Neither were
there any statistically significant differences in these factors
between eventual success and failure.
TABLE I
SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF 926 MEN RESTORED DURING
MARCH BY TYPE OF CONFINEMENT ACTIVITY
TYPE OF

No.
Prisons
25
661
DisBars
Retra 2Coms 185
55
Other
926
TOTAL

ACTmTY

FAILURE

SUCCESS

TOTAL

No.
19
418
135
42
614

PERCENT

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

PERCENT

76.00
63.24
72.98
76.36
66.31

No.
6
243
50
13
312

PERCENT

24.00
36.76
27.02
23.64
33.69

The type of last duty was a significant factor in subsequent
success or failure following restoration to duty. A greater percentage of successes than failures had previous duty aboard
ship. The actual difference was 17.50% with a critical ratio
of 5.06,3 which lends support to the hypothesis that men whose
last duty was aboard ship tend to be-better risks for restoration
to duty than those who were not on such duty.
TABLE II
SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF 926 MEN RESTORED TO DUTY
DURING MARCH BY TYPE OF LAST DUTY
SUCCESSES

FAILURES

No.

PCT.

No.

PCT.

DIrFF.

C. R.

Large or small ship 322
292
Other

52.44
47.56

109
203

34.94
65.06

17.50
17.50

5.06
5.06

STATION

The findings also showed that there was a significantly greater percentage of men with previous duty aboard ship in the
Retraining Command group than in the Disciplinary Barracks
group. This suggests that while the Retraining Command
population was unselected with respect to such factors as age,
education, etc., enumerated above, the men confined in such
commands may have had more positive motivations for restoration to duty than those confined elsewhere by virtue of
their previous duty aboard ship. Undoubtedly there were
other factors in such motivation, too, but no additional data
1 The majority of the sample was in the non-rated category.
2 A very small percentage of general'court martial prisoners were
authorized to be confined in larger brigs due to lack of space facilities
in Prisons, Disciplinary Barracks and Retraining Commands. In these
activities a training and work program was operated. Such have been
designated "other" throughout this report.
s In considering differences between groups the ratio of 3.00 between the actual difference and the standard error of the difference was
used as the critical reliability score.
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were available for analysis. One such set of factors might have
derived from the nature of the program of the Retraining
Commands and the men's response to it.
The length of time the men comprising this sample were required to serve in confinement was relatively short as indicated
by an over-all average of 6.27 months for the successes and 6.42
months for the failures. With the exception of those confined
in the prisons, the variations in this average by type of confinement activity was very small. Neither were there significant differences between ultimate success and failure. The
principal reason for this probably lies in the fact that more
than 90%/ of the men had been committed to serve "probated 4
sentences" which predetermined the time and conditions of
release from confinement without particular reference to the
adjustment potential of the individual concerned.
TABLE III
AVERAGE LENGTH OF APPROVED SENTENCES OF SUCCESSES
AND FAILURES AMONG 926 MEN RESTORED TO
DUTY DURING MARCH BY TYPE OF
CONFINEMENT ACTIVITY
TYPE oF

AcTmTY
Prisons
DisBars
RetraComs
Other
TOTAL

SUCCESS

No.
19
418
135
42
614

MEAN
27.37
6.30
6.95
5.20
6.27

FAILuREs

No.
6
243
50
13
312

MEAN
17.66
5.59
8.12
3.85
6.42

Unauthorized absence was the predominate offense of the
group, accounting for 94.79%o of the successes and 98.40% of
the failures. In this, the sample studied differed significantly
from the March, 1945 cross-section survey referred to. This
was expected because the sample consisted of only those who
were restored to duty.
4 The awarding of "probated" sentences was an administrative
policy (later modified) whereby the court convening authority, in approving a court-martial sentence, was authorized to stipulate that if the
prisoner satis-Lctorily served a specified portion of the sentence he
would be restoi- .d to duty automatically with the balance of the sentence
held in abeyance pending good behavior for a specified period of probation. Under this sentencing procedure, it was incumbent upon the commanding officer of the institution to restore the prisoner to duty, as
directed by the sentence, so long as the prisoner maintained a satisfactory conduct record while confined. Such action was mandatory regardless of the opinions of the commanding officer of the confinement activity
and his staff as to the timeliness and suitability of restoration to duty.
In this sense, the term "probation," as used by the Navy and in this
study actually approximates "parole" as applied in civil cases. It had
been hoped that it might be possible to compare the success and failure
of those restored to duty in this manner with the success and failure of
those restored to duty as the result of the recommendation of the commanding officer and subsequent action of the Navy Clemency Board.
Unfortunately, there were found in the 926 cases only 48 of the latter
and it was concluded that any differences relating to only 5% of the
sample would not be significant.
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TABLE IV
SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF 926 MEN RESTORED DURING
MARCH BY TYPE OF OFFENSE
TOTAL
SUCCESS
FAILURE
GCMP DiFF. Suc.
OFFENSE
No. PCT. No. PCT. No. PCT. MA. '45 FAIL. C. R.
AWOL, AOL
Desertion
889 96.00 582 94.79 307 98.40 83.22 12.78 10.06
Other
37
4.00
32
5.21
5
1.60 16.78
3.61

The presence and nature of previous naval delinquency
showed up significantly as a possible factor in success or failure. About one-third of the men had no previous recorded
naval offenses but the proportion of successes having no previous naval offenses was 12.45% greater than the failures, with
a critical ratio of 3.82. Conversely, while the majority of previous offenses were unauthorized absence, the percentage of
such previous offenses for the success group was 14.05% less
TABLE V
SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF 926 MEN RESTORED TO DUTY
DURING MARCH BY TYPE OF PREVIOUS OFFENSE
TOTAL
SUCCESS
FAILURE GCMP DIrFF. Suc.
OFFENSE
No. PCT. No. PCT. No. PCT. MAn. '45 FAIL. C. R.
AWOL, AOL 445 48.06 266 43.32 179 57.37 53.49 14.05
4.06
Desertion
Other
173 18.68 118 19.23
55 17.63
1.60
1.31
No Offense
308 33.26 230 37.45
78 25.00
12.45
3.82

than that of the failure group. A critical ratio of 4.06 suggests
that not only the extent of prior delinquency but the nature
of the delinquency pattern (in this case unauthorized absence)
is a significant factor in post-release adjustment.
Factors relating to institutional adjustment, other than the

forfeiture of "good time" and escape from confinement, were
not available. No significant findings resulted from analysis
of these two items.

Follow-Up Data
In considering the "follow-up" data a number of assumptions made during the operation of the program were tested
within the limit of the data. For example, it had been thought
that the length of time existing between date of release from
confinement and date of reporting to first permanent duty
might be a causal factor for failure. On the contrary the average elapsed time for the successes was 21.88 days and for the

failures who reached permanent duty stations 10.93 days. The
critical ratio between them was 5.95, which lends to the hypothesis that motivations for restoration to duty appear to bear
no relationship to the length of intervening time involved.
This same differential existed for the men restored to duty
from the disciplinary barracks but not those from the retraining commands. In the latter case there was no significant dif-

ference.
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TABLE VI
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS TO FIRST PERMANENT
DUTY STATION
SUCCESSES

No.
Total
587
Prisons
18
DisBar 403
Retr'n'g 128
Other
38

FAILURES

M.
21.88
28.39
27.97
17.62
36.34

No.
149

M.
10.93

DIFr.
10.95

C.R.
5.95

108
36

10.01
13.94

17.96
3.68

8.31
.54

With respect to the ntimber of intervening activities passed
through enroute to first permanent duty station, it was found
that generally, this number had no bearing on eventual success or failure. The percentage of failures who went through
no intervening activities appears larger than that of the successes, but this was due to the high percentage of failures who
failed before reporting to their first permanent duty.
TABLE VII
NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES PASSED THROUGH PRIOR TO FIRST
PERMANENT DUTY STATION BY SUCCESS AND FAILURE
No.
TOTAL SUCCESS
ACTIVITIES No.
PCT.
0
24
3.92
1
424
69.06

TOTAL

No.
20
117

FAILURE

PCT.
13.42
78.52

2

130

21.17

8

5.37

3

1

4
Unknown
Total

.16

3

2
33
614

.34
5.37
100.00

2.01

1
0
149

.66
100.00

1 or more

557

90.72

129

86.58

DIFF.
9.50
9.46

C. R.

15.80

4.50

4.48
2.29

1.85

.32
4.14

1.51

In analyzing the types of transient activities the sample group
passed through, it was found that they conveniently grouped

themselves into five categories:
1. Receiving Stations, Training and Distribution Centers
and Armed Guard Centers. These activities were the most
frequently used activities for redistribution purposes.
2. Receiving Station to ship to Receiving Station. In many
cases the man was sent to a continental receiving station then
placed on board a ship as a passenger and sent to an overseas

receiving staion for further assignment.
3. Other. This was a small group who were assigned to a
training center or other activity which is not normally a distribution center for further assignment.

4. None. This was the group which went directly from the
confinement activity to a permanent billet.
5. Unknown. This was a small group upon which no information was available.
Table VIII indicates that the majority of both successes and
failures were restored to duty via Receiving Stations, Train-

ing and Distribution Centers and Armed Guard Centers. While
the actual difference between successes and failures in this cate-
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gory amounted to 10.17%, the critical ratio was only 2.48. A
relatively small percentage of cases were restored to duty via
the Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station sequence, but it
will be noted that the number of successes was greater than the
number of failures. The reason for this is clear. As will be
shown, the overwhelming majority of failures was caused by
unauthorized absence. Those who were restored to duty via
Receiving Stations-Ships-Receiving Stations left the continental United States almost immediately after release from confinement and thereby were confronted with little opportunity
or incentive to "go over the hill" again. The numbers of cases
going through "other" and "unknown" activities were extremely small. The category in Table VIII indicating the number
of men going through no intervening activities is the same as
that in Table VII. A large number of failures became involved
in further trouble before reaching their assigned duty.
TABLE VIII
NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES PASSED THROUGH PRIOR TO FIRST
PERMANENT DUTY STATION BY SUCCESS AND
FAILURE OF 926 MEN
SUCCESSES
No.
PCT.

TYPE ACTIVITY

Receiving Station;

T&DC; A.G.C.
RecSta-ShipRecSta
Other
None
Unknown
Total

FAILURES
No.
PCT.

DIFF.

C. R.

428

69.7

119

79.87

10.17

2.48

99
30
24
33
614

16.12
4.89
3.92
5.37

4
6
20
0
149

2.68
4.03
13.42
0

13.44
.86
9.50

4.32
4.48

A total of 79.63% of the success group was assigned to a

ship as first permanent duty station following restoration. Of
the 312 failures only 149 remained on duty long enough to
reach a first permanent duty station. Of this latter group a
total of 61.33% was assigned to ships. Of the total failure
group 29.48% actually reported aboard ships. Although a
significantly lower number of failures than successes failed to

receive shipboard assignments more than half of the failure
group did not reach any kind of permanent duty station. Of the
failure group that reached a first permanent duty station
the percentage assigned to ships was significantly lower than
the total group and disciplinary barracks group and from the
corresponding success groups. There was no significant differ-

ence between the corresponding retraining groups.

These

findings point to the desirability of assigning restored men to
ships for first permanent duty.
Despite the relatively large number of men who were assigned duty aboard ship, less than one-third of the successes
and only 4 of the failures were on duty in a combat zone long
enough to qualify for a campaign area ribbon at the end of
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the six month follow-up interval. Although this difference
was significant in favor of the successes, there were no significant differences between the four types of confinement activities in which the men-had been confined. The number who
participated in battle engagements or received various commendations was exceedingly small. Approximately one-fourth
of the total group received subsequent advancements in rate,
but only seven (7), -of them were in the failure group and it
apparently made no difference whether the men were restored
from a retraining command or some other type of confinement
activityTABLE IX
PARTICIPATION IN THEATERS OF WAR BY SUCCESS
AND FAILURE
THEA-

TYPE

TERS

ACTIVITY'

SUCCESSES

No.

DIFF.

C. R.

308
241
48

98.72
99.19
96.00

28.36
29.32
30.07

10.24
9.28
4.13

29.64

4

1.29

28.36

30.14

2

.82

29.32

34.07

2

4.00

30.07

Total all
activities- 432
DisBar
292
ReTra
89
Total all
activities - 182

70.36
69.86
65.93

More

DisBar

One or
More

ReTra

None
None
None
One or
MoreOne or

126
46-

FAILURES

PCT.

PCT.

No.

On the negative side, while 87.13%/ of the successes did not
become involved in- any subsequent disciplinary action, 69
committed offenses on one occasion, eight (8) on two occasions, one (1) on three occasions and one (1) on four occasions.
There were no significant differences between types of confinement activities. Five of the 79 committing subsequent
offenses were either declared, probation violators or awarded a
second general court-martial, but they were restored to duty
again within the six month follow-up interval. These arbitrarily were included in the success group. Most of these subsequent offenses were for unauthorized absence and occurred
on an average of sixty-four days after the date of release from
confinement. Eighteen of the successes were discharged from
the naval service by the end of the follow-up period.
Eighteen of the successes were discharged from the Naval
Service prior to the termination of the six months' followup period. Fourteen were released under honorable conditions, one as unsuitable for the naval service and three for
dependency. The reasons for discharge showed fourteen released as a result of medical survey, one because of discharge
points and three for dependency. These men stayed on duty
an average of 108 days from the date of release from confinement to date of discharge.
At the end of the six month interval 180 of the 312 failures
were reconfined (most of them as probation violators or as the
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result of a subsequent general court-martial), 44 were still "at
large" and 88 had been discharged from the service. Practically
the entire group (96.67%) was in difficulty for unauthorized
absence. As previously indicated, more than one-half of them
had not yet reported to their first permanent duty before the
offense was committed. These men were of little value to the
Navy from the standpoint of service. The average length of
time from date of release from confinement to date of failure
offense was only 35 days. The Retraining Command failures
were in a duty status significantly longer before failing than
those from the other confinement activities. This ability to
make a satisfactory adjustment for a longer period of time is
possibly due, in part, to the fact that a greater percentage of
these men found themselves aboard ship in a relatively short
time after they were released from confinement.
TABLE X
STATUS OF FAILURES-TERMINATION OF FOLLOW-UP
PERIOD
OTHER
RETRA
DISBAR
PRISONS
TOTAL
PCT.
PCT. No. PcT. No.
No. PCT. No. PCT. No.
STATUS180
Confined
44
At Large
Discharged 88

57.69
14.10
28.21

1
1
4

16.66 142
16.66 33
66.67 68

58.44
13.58
27.98

27
9
14

54.00
18.00
28.00

10
1
2

76.92
7.69
15.38

SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FOUR DISCIPLINARY BARRAcKs

One unanticipated result of the study was the finding that
a considerable discrepancy existed between the successes and
failures of men restored to duty from the same type of confinement activity. During the period of confinement of the 926
offenders comprising this study there existed six disciplinary
barracks located in various parts of the United States. Although
the mission and organization of each were identical, no two
were alike. Not only did the physical plant differ widely in
each case but the stage of program development and other factors were definitely dissimilar.
To determine the nature and extent of some of these differences, four disciplinary barracks were selected for further study.
They have been designated as Disciplinary Barracks, A, B, C,
and D. These particular commands were chosen for several
reasons. First, they were the four largest and therefore the
most likely to produce the most reliable results. They were
in operation during most of the time the 926 offenders studied
were confined. Two each were chosen to represent the East
Coast and West Coast confinement activities in the event there
might be discovered a significant geographical differential.
Finally, there existed in these four commands several factors
which it was thought might influence in considerable degree
the success-failure ratio beyond what might have been expected
of these institutions as disciplinary barracks type confinement

activities.
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TABLE XI
DIFFERENCE IN SUCCESS AND FAILURE AMONG FOUR
DISCIPLINARY BARRACKS
TOTAL

DisBar
DisBar
DisBar
DisBar

"A"
"B"
"C"
"D"

SUCCESS

No.

No.

PCT.

154
178
103
149

95
85
74
111

61.69
47.75
71.84
74.50

NO.
59
93
29
38

FAMURE
PCT.

38.31
52.25
28.16
25.50

Table XI indicates that between these four commands the
percentage of success varied from 47.75 to 74.50. Approximately one-third (36.76%) of the "disciplinary barracks"
group of the total 926 sample failed. By comparison, 52.25%o
of the Disciplinary Barracks B, 38.31%0 of those from Disciplinary Barracks A, 28.16% of Disciplinary Barracks C, and
25.50% from Disciplinary Barracks D failed. The failures of
Disciplinary Barracks B only were significantly different
(higher) than the total "disciplinary barracks" group and significantly higher than the failures of Disciplinary Barracks C
and D.
The same factors analyzed for the total sample were analyzed again in the same manner for the four disciplinary barracks. With respect to those factors indicative of the nature of
the population, significant differences were found only in the
following: marital status, length of service, previous rate held,
type of last duty and length of sentence.
Disciplinary Barracks A had significantly more married men
than the "disciplinary barracks" group of the total sample, and
while there was no appreciable difference between success and
failure, significantly more of the Disciplinary Barracks A successes were married than the successes of either Disciplinary
Barracks B, C or D. This was thought to be due partly, at
least to the location of Disciplinary Barracks A in metropolitan New York, toward which men with families tended to gravitate while on unauthorized leave. To a lesser extent this was

also true of Disciplinary Barracks C by virtue of its proximity
to Los Angeles.
Length of service, as a factor in the four (4) disciplinary
barracks approximated that of the total sample, but the average for the Disciplinary Barracks B cases was 4.68 months less
than the average for Disciplinary Barracks C and the average
length of service for Disciplinary Barracks B failures was 17.44
months compared with 26.12 months for Disciplinary Barracks
C, with a critical ratio of 3.07. Hence, while there were no
significant differences between success and failure as to. length
of service, the men from Disciplinary Barracks B, especially
the failures, had less service than those of the other three commands and significantly less than the Disciplinary Barracks C.
Again, there was a greater percentage of non-rated men in
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the Disciplinary Barracks B group than the others. For the
entire sample there was a significantly greater percentage of
non-rated failures than successes and a greater percentage of
such failures at Disciplinary Barracks B than at either Disciplinary Barracks C or D. This situation, coupled with the
relatively short length of service of the Disciplinary Barracks
B group as compared with the other three commands, suggests
that there was a greater degree of inexperience among the Disciplinary Barracks B men. It is also possible, although there
are no data except informal surveys, that there may have been
other reasons, such as lack of ability and lack of motivation that
might account in part for the discrepancy in rate held.
In the same pattern, fewer of the Disciplinary Barracks B
men had previous duty aboard ship than the men from the
other three disciplinary barracks. Disciplinary Barracks C had
a significantly higher proportion of men with previous shipboard duty than the total "disciplinary barracks" sample and
the number of such men in the Disciplinary Barracks C successes was significantly greater than the same factor among the
Disciplinary Barracks B successes. There was a statistical tendency for the same difference to appear in comparison with the
Disciplinary Barracks A successes and, to a lesser extent, with
the Disciplinary Barracks D successes. These differences in
favor of the two West Coast commands is thought to be due to
the fact that at the time there was no West Coast Retraining
Command to which there would have been sent the most likely
prospects for restoration to duty. The import of the situation
that existed in favor of Disciplinary Barracks D and C, particularly, is apparent from the conclusion previously indicated
that men whose last duty was aboard ship tend to be better
risks for restoration to duty than those who have not had that
experience.
Finally, the Disciplinary Barracks B men were serving significantly longer sentences than the men from Disciplinary
Barracks C and D. The length of sentence awarded was not
based so much on the severity of the offense or needs of the
offender for discipline and training as on fortuitous variation
in the sentencing practices of the different naval districts. This
alone accounts for the differences in the average length of
sentence for the four commands. Notwithstanding, the differences in the average sentences of the successes and failures
were too slight to be meaningful.
Consideration of the manner of commitment to the command and the actual length of time served in confinement at
the activity produced no statistically significant results bearing
on ultimate success or failure, despite the fact that there was
considerable variation in the number of men committed by
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transfer from some other confinement activity and that the
average length of time at the command varied from 3.30
months to 4.49 months.
Follow-up data relating to the number of activities passed
through between date of release and date of reporting to first
permanent duty approximated the pattern of the "disciplinary
barracks" group of the total sample. The one exception was
Disci linary Barracks D. Similarly, the four commands did
not differ significantly from each other except Disciplinary
Barracks D where there definitely were fewer men restored to
duty through no intervening activity and significantly more
through one or more activities. This was due to the fact that
36% of all Disciplinary Barracks D restorations were via the
Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station sequence, as will be
shown. The differences between success and failure for each
command showed a significantly greater percentage of failures
than successes restored to duty through no intervening activities. This was the result of so many failures committing offenses culminating in failure before they reached their first assigned duty. Likewise, significant ratios between success and
failure appeared for each command in the proportion of success who were restored through one or more activities. In this
respect, the four commands differed from the total sample
where there was no such difference.
As regards the types of activities passed through to the first
permanent duty, the majority of men were restored to duty via
Receiving Stations and their equivalents. The notable exception again was Disciplinary Barracks D where significantly
fewer were restored through Receiving Stations and significantly more were restored through the Receiving Station-ShipReceiving Station category. A critical ratio of 2.99 was found
in the case of Disciplinary Barracks A where 12.25% more men
than in the total "disciplinary barracks" group were restored
through Receiving Stations, indicating the existence of a probable significant difference. In the "Receiving Station" category differences between success and failure for any particular
command showed only that Disciplinary Barracks A had a significantly greater percentage of successes than failures restored
to duty through this medium. In the case of Disciplinary Barracks C this situation was reversed. The reason for this is not
known. The "Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station" group
showed a significant difference for Disciplinary Barracks D in
favor of the successes but, while a tendency for the same difference to appear in the other commands was noted, significant
ratios were not found. Significantly more failures than successes went through no intervening activities, as indicated
above.
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With respect to the length of elapsed time between date of
release from confinement and date of reporting for first permanent duty, it was found that the Disciplinary Barracks C
average was significantly less than the average for the "disciplinary barracks" group of the total sample, as well as the average for each of the other three commands and that the Disciplinary Barracks D average was significantly higher. The
reasons are that, in the case of Disciplinary Barracks C, nearly
all of the men were restored to duty directly via the adjacent
Receiving Station with little lost time, whereas most of the
Disciplinary Barracks D men were restored via the Receiving
Station-Ship-Receiving Station sequence and reported to their
first assigned duty after a considerable lapse of time. Because
of the latter, Disciplinary Barracks D was the only command
that showed a significant difference between success and failure, wherein the average elapsed time for successes was 30.80
days greater than the average for the failures.
In terms of such positive follow-up data as were available
for analysis, it was found that more of the Disciplinary Barracks C men were on duty in the various battle zones long
enough to qualify for the campaign area ribbon than the men
from the other three commands and that significantly more of
the Disciplinary Barracks C men were subsequently advanced
in rate. (Exception: Disciplinary Barracks D with a critical
ratio of 2.08.) There is demonstrated here again the tendency
of favorable factors to concentrate in the West Coast commands
which was caused partially by the absence of a West Coast Retraining Command at the time. The relative preponderance
of rate advancements for the Disciplinary Barracks C men may
have derived in some degree from the Disciplinary Barracks C
practice of assigning large numbers of men to ships upon the
specific request of the ships' commanding officers.
Findings related to subsequent offenses committed by the
successes from the four commands were not statistically significant. Analysis of the type of duty to which the successes were
assigned at the end of the six-month follow-up period showed
that a significantly larger number of Disciplinary Barracks D
men were assigned to ships than men from the other commands. This probably was due in part to the length of time
it took these men to reach their first permanent duty and partly
to the fact that these men were placed aboard ship in the forward areas rather than in United States ports.
Although the number of failures differed considerably
among the four commands, the reasons for failure, the time of
failure and the ultimate disposition of the cases showed no
statistically significant differences either from the "disciplinary
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barracks" group of the total sample or between the four commands.
CONCLUSIONS

This study has presented factors relating to the successes
and failure of 926 Navy general court-martial prisoners restored to duty under war-time conditions during the month of
March 1945. The data was based entirely on performance
records, the follow-up period was of only 6 months' duration,
the number of cases included from certain activities was too
small to be statistically significant, and certain data, such as
psychiatric findings, psychometric data and social cases histories, were not available for analysis. The conclusions may be
summarized as follows:
1. A greater percentage of men restored to duty from Retraining Commands succeeded than those restored to duty from
other types of confinement activities. This probably was due
in part to such selective factors as attitudes and the nature of
the program af the command (which items were not available
for analysis) rather than such factors as age, education, length
of service, etc.
2. Men whose last duty was aboard ship tend to be better
risks for restoration to duty than those who have not had such
duty. This factor also accounts in part for the relatively high
rate of success among men restored to duty from Retraining
Commands.
3. Length of sentence has no bearing on eventual success
or failure. Despite this, it is believed that there is a critical
minimum below which a sentence would be completely ineffective. The study undertaken was limited by the fact that
the length of sentence and conditions of release were predetermined without reference to the adjustment potential of
the individual concerned.
4. The nature and extent of previous delinquency is a definite factor in success or failure. The nature of delinquency
also tends to fall into a pattern as evidenced by the fact that in
this study unauthorized absence was the predominant delinquency in previous offenses, current offense and reasons for
failure.
5. The length of time between date of release from confinement and date of reporting for first permanent duty was
not a causal factor for failure. Neither were the number or
types of intervening activities passed through to first permanent duty significant factors in success or failure.
6. Most of the men who failed did so through unauthorized
absence again and over half of them failed before they reached
their first assigned duty.
7. A disappointingly small percentage of the men were on
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duty in a campaign zone long enough to qualify for the award
of a campaign area ribbon. Even fewer participated in actual
engagements. From the standpoint of existing policy more
men should have been assigned combat duty.
8. About 25% of the men were advanced in rate within 6
months after being restored to duty, indicating that former
general court-martial prisoners are not discriminated against
with respect to opportunities for advancement.
9. Approximately 13% of the successes became involved in
subsequent offenses for which they were not punished by revocation of probation or awarded another general court-martial.
10. There was considerable variation in the success and
failure of men restored to duty from the same type of confinement activity. This was due partly to the nature of the population with respect to such factors as length of service, whether
the men were non-rated and whether they had previous duty
aboard ship. The manner of restoring men to duty is also
significant, e.g., the Disciplinary Barracks C policy of assigning men to ships at commanding officers' requests and the Disciplinary Barracks D sequence of Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station which provided little opportunity or incentive
for subsequent unauthorized absence.
The study was undertaken not only to determine as closely
as possible what happened to a group of general court-martial
prisoners who were restored to duty but to ascertain whether
there might be developed one or more postulates which might
be helpful in evaluating the confinement program and suggest
means of improving techniques and procedures. These postulates seem to be indicated:
1. That more prisoners should be sent to Retraining Commands for confinement. This suggestion derives from the fact
that the percentage of success of those restored to duty from
Disciplinary Barracks ranged as high as 74.50%, At Disciplinary Barracks the opportunities and facilities for specific
restoration training are exceedingly limited. At prisons and
other places cf confinement they are virtually non-existent.
With respect to the consideration of future cases for restoration to duty greater weight should be placed on the following
factors: whether the offender has a record of previous offenses
for unauthorized absence, the cumulative effect of his prior
delinquency, and whether he has had previous duty aboard
ship.
3. In restoring men to duty they should either be assigned
ships in accordance with the Disciplinary Barracks C plan described, or, if this is impossible, they should be placed aboard
ship for immediate transportation overseas for further assignment to duty after they reach an outlying Receiving Station.
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The analyses and conclusions of this study are scarcely more
than a scratch on the surface of the data that must be evaluated
sometime if a total comprehension of the myriad influences
and conditions which mark the difference between successful
adjustment and failure is to be sought. Yet, the conclusions
reached here should be sufficient to refute numerous popular
concepts as to why some men fail where others succeed. Some
of these errors in thinking are: that length of service, alone,
(possibly because of some obscure indoctrinational value) determines in the majority of cases whether a man has sufficiently
learned his responsibilities to the service to be a continued
asset rather than a liability; that the majority of men "go over
the hill" from Receiving Stations, especially after being restored to duty following confinement, because they are held
for uncertain periods of time in these activities awaiting assignment to permanent duty; and that efforts to "rehabilitate"
men who "reach the general court-martial stage" are useless.
The need for further research is apparent. Future studies
should include such qualitative data as psychiatric and psychometric findings, social case history material, and specific measures of the nature and conditions of confinement, as well as
several factors relating to the administration of the program.
Not the least value of the present undertaking will be the suggestions it may contain as to the nature and direction of additional researches in the same problems.

